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Abstract
What determines whether people 
dehumanise another person or 
themselves? We propose that the 
construal of a violation as moral or 
value-based influences who is dehu-
manised. Previous research has 
demonstrated that people perceive 
morals to be objective indicators of 
right and wrong (Goodwin & Darley, 
2008), while values are viewed as 
subjective (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). 
Here, participants recalled past 
moral or value violations, then 
reflected on the thoughts and feel-
ings of either the other person victi-
mised by their violation, or their 
own thoughts and feelings. 
Participants then rated dehumanisa-
tion of either the other or them-
selves using the Human Nature and 
Key-words 
Dehumanization, 
objectification, morals, 
values, ethical 
behaviour, self-focus, 
other-focus
Mots-clés 
Déshumanisation, 
objectivation, morale, 
valeurs, comportement 
éthique, focalisation 
sur soi, focalisation 
sur autrui
Résumé
Quels facteurs conduisent-ils les 
individus à déshumaniser autrui ou 
eux-mêmes ? Nous proposons 
qu’en visager une transgression 
comme de nature morale ou fondée 
sur des valeurs influence l’objet de 
la déshumanisation (soi vs. autrui). 
Des travaux antérieurs ont montré 
que les individus perçoivent la 
morale (morals) comme un indica-
teur objectif du bien et du mal 
(Goodwin & Darley, 2008), alors que 
les valeurs sont perçues comme 
subjectives (Schwartz, 2003). Dans 
la présente contribution, les parti-
cipants étaient amenés à rappeler 
des transgressions morales ou de 
valeurs, et étaient ensuite amenés 
à se pencher soit sur les pensées et 
les sentiments de la victime, soit sur 
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Uniqueness Scale. We found that 
participants dehumanised the other 
more when recalling a value viola-
tion. This result suggests that differ-
ences in construal between morals 
and values can have an impact on 
dehumanisation.
leurs propres pensées et senti-
ments. Les participants évaluaient 
ensuite la déshumanisation soit 
d’autrui soit d’eux-mêmes sur la 
base de l’échelle de nature et d’uni-
cité humaines. Nous avons constaté 
que les participants déshumani-
saient autrui davantage lorsqu’ils se 
rappelaient d’une violation de 
valeur. Ce résultat suggère que les 
différences d’appréhension de la 
morale et des valeurs peuvent exer-
cer un impact différent sur la déshu-
manisation.
“We march up, moody or good-tempered soldiers – we reach 
the zone where the front begins and become on the instant 
human animals.”
“I did not want to kill you… But you were only an idea to me 
before, an abstraction that lived in my mind and called forth 
its appropriate response… I thought of your hand-grenades, 
of your bayonet, of your rifle.”
remarQue (1929/2004, pp. 30, 117)
In All Quiet on the Western Front by Erich M. Remarque, Paul Baumer enlists in the German army during World War I, and is 
quickly consumed by the horrors of war. On the battlefield, as a 
way to make sense of the events, he learns to dehumanise 
himself and others as objects and animals. Dehumanisation has 
been investigated and described in different ways (Klein & 
Gervais, 2015), and the distinction between animal dehumanisa-
tion and objectification (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007) is but one 
approach employed in extant social psychological literature. 
Explicit ways include denying morality and justice to others 
(Opotow, 1990) and delegitimising others by casting them into 
extremely negative social categories (Bar-Tal, 1990). More subtle 
ways include inferring a lack of secondary emotions, such as 
nostalgia (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; 
Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Despite the range of definitions, 
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moral considerations and reduced mental state inferences to the 
targets of dehumanisation feature prominently in each of these 
conceptualisations (Harris & Fiske, 2009; Bastian & Haslam, 
2010). And as we can see through Baumer’s experience, a person 
is capable of dehumanising and objectifying others as well as the 
self. Though this anecdote is set to the backdrop of war and 
conflict, dehumanisation is common in our everyday lives, and 
influences how we perceive others and ourselves.
To note, extant literature has viewed the relationship between 
dehumanisation and objectification differently (Gervais, Bernard, 
Klein, & Allen, 2013, Chapter 1). For example, some see them as 
completely overlapping, while others see one as subsuming the 
other. Dehumanisation has largely been used in intergroup 
contexts (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2005; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006; 
dehumanising the homeless or minorities), while objectification 
has largely been used in the context of gender (e.g., Fredrickson 
& Roberts, 1997; Fredrickson, Roberts, Noll, Quinn, & Twenge, 
1998; Harper & Tiggemann, 2008; females objectifying their 
bodies). In our work, we view them as largely overlapping and 
interchangeable.1
other- versus self-dehumanisation
Other­dehumanisation. Dehumanising others has been linked to 
a wide range of social issues, including sexism (females as animals 
or objects, Cikara, Eberhardt, & Fiske, 2011; Rudman & Mescher, 
2012), stigma (see Harris & Fiske, 2009, for a review) and racism 
(outgroup members as less agentic than ingroup members, 
Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). Because of its far-
reaching consequences, it has also been used to understand 
destructive global events, such as genocide (Kelman, 1973) and 
torturing of prisoners of war (Fiske, Harris, & Cuddy, 2004).
Dehumanising others has important implications for how we 
subsequently behave. Seeing others as less than human, whether as 
animals or automata, leads to alarming consequences. For example, 
1.  Dehumanisation has been separated into animalistic and mechanistic in previous literature. 
However, given their high correlations in our work and in others (e.g., Bastian et al., 2012), 
we will not separate the two.
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individuals provide less support for rehabilitation when sex 
offenders are seen as less human (Viki, Fullerton, Raggett, Tait, & 
Wiltshire, 2012) and males report being more likely to sexually 
victimise women when they associate females with animals 
(Rudman & Mescher, 2012). Dehumanising others can also lead 
to outright physical aggression (Bandura, Underwood, & 
Fromson, 1975; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). For instance, the 
Black-ape association can alter participants’ judgments about 
violence against a Black target, and individuals are more likely to 
believe that the beating a Black suspect receives is justified when 
primed with apes (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008). 
Disconcertingly, an archival study also showed that Blacks who 
are perceived to be ape-like are more likely to be convicted of 
capital crimes and executed (Goff et al., 2008).
Dehumanising can lead to brutality, but brutality can also lead to 
dehumanisation. In a virtual reality study, experienced gamers 
played a violent first-person shooter game inside an fMRI machine. 
During the game, parts of the brain implicated in social cognition 
showed less activation (Mathiak & Weber, 2006). The reduced 
activity is consistent with other-dehumanising brain responses in 
intergroup contexts (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010; 
Harris & Fiske, 2006), and suggests that engaging in aggression, 
even in a virtual setting, leads to other-dehumanisation.
Self­dehumanisation. In contrast to other-dehumanisation, there 
has been much less work done in the area of self-dehumanisation 
in relation to ethical behaviours. However, despite the dearth of 
work, we know that individuals are capable of reducing infer-
ences of their own mental life. In situations of rape, victims 
self-dehumanise and self-objectify, which lead to freezing 
responses, self-blame and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Moor, 
Ben-Meir, Golan-Shapira, & Farchi, 2013). Self-dehumanisation 
can also occur when the self perpetrates a harmful act. When 
students played Mortal Kombat or Call of Duty 2 – both violent 
video games in which their avatars perpetrate and are the recipi-
ents of violence – they rated themselves as being more animalistic 
and machinistic (Bastian, Jetten & Radke, 2012). These effects 
were not accounted for by global self-esteem or changes in 
mood, suggesting that violence directly affects how we perceive 
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our internal, mental life. In addition to outright brutality, isolation 
can also lead to self-dehumanisation. When participants recalled 
a time when they were socially excluded or played a socially 
excluding game, they rated themselves as more lacking in human 
attributes (Bastian & Haslam, 2010).
These results suggest that although we should be motivated to 
believe that we are human beings with thriving mental and cogni-
tive life, there are circumstances under which we may reduce that 
perception. It is important to note, however, that any motivation 
to reduce mental inferences may not be conscious. For example, 
motivated reasoning is not conscious, but equally serves some 
kind of goal attainment (Kunda, 1990).
differences between other- and self-dehumanisation
So far, we have categorised dehumanisation into self and other. 
However, we should note that the two phenomena are not mutu-
ally exclusive and can co-occur (e.g., Bastian et al., 2012; 
Loughnan et al., 2015). When someone commits a harmful act, he 
can accept that he is a bad person for behaving badly, or he can 
rationalise his behaviour in order to maintain the belief that he is 
a good person. If he rationalises his behaviour, he subsequently 
has two choices. In the first choice, he can reduce the inference 
of the victim’s humanity. If he did a harmful act to a mindless 
machine or animal, the act is considered less contemptible and 
therefore less bad. In the second choice, he can reduce the infer-
ence of his own humanity. If he is animal-like or machine-like to 
begin with, he cannot be considered as culpable for the behav-
iour and is therefore less bad. Like the protagonist in All Quiet on 
the Western Front, an actor can choose to engage in both, or 
perhaps choose between other-dehumanisation and self-dehu-
manisation. What might determine her choice? 
Other-dehumanisation is different from self-dehumanisation. The 
desire to dehumanise or objectify others can stem from a host of 
factors, such as negative emotions like disgust and contempt that 
the other evokes (Harris & Fiske, 2006; 2009), an expectation that 
the other will demand financial or emotional resources (Cameron 
& Payne, 2011; Cameron, Harris, & Payne, 2014), to justify a harm 
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that was committed against the other or members of that other’s 
group (Bar-Tal, 2005; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Opotow, 
1990), or simply because they are unlike us (Haslam, 2006; 
Leyens et al., 2001, 2003). On the other hand, since individuals 
are motivated to maintain a positive sense of self (Leary, Tambor, 
Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Williams & Gilovich, 2008), self-dehuman-
isation may occur when it is difficult to rationalize away or justify 
one’s harmful behaviour (Bandura, 1999). Thinking of the self 
like a machine or animal in relation to a specific bad behaviour 
reduces culpability, thus preserving a general positive view of the 
self. Though one may argue that a positive sense of self drives 
some of the causes of other-dehumanisation like post-hoc harm 
justification, it certainly does not motivate them all. This motiva-
tional difference between other- and self-dehumanisation could 
thus be reflected in separate factors that might give rise to these 
two phenomena.
Comparing other- to self-dehumanisation is important for theo-
retical and practical reasons. Firstly, to date there has been no 
research demonstrating what drives self- versus other-dehuman-
isation, and the circumstances influencing each. Secondly, this will 
build upon the existing research on self-dehumanisation. In the 
studies on self-dehumanisation reviewed above, all the participants 
suffered harmful acts; here we investigate self-dehumanisation 
when people commit harmful acts. Importantly, the link between 
the two impacts how we understand and provide support to targets 
of dehumanisation – someone who strips herself of mental life 
may perceive and react to the world differently than someone who 
is stripped of mental life.
violation construal
When someone perpetrates a dehumanising act, both the self 
and the victim can be candidates for dehumanisation. In the 
studies reviewed previously, elements of mistreatment, harm and 
moral emotions are present. Since morality is a common thread 
in accounts of both self- and other-dehumanisation, the construal 
of the violation could determine whether someone dehumanises 
the other versus the self. We term this differentiation “violation
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construal”2. Specifically, the violation or transgression can be 
framed as a violation of morals or a violation of values, which we 
explain in more detail below.
Morals vs. values. Extant research across different fields, such as 
Psychology, Neuroscience, Sociology, Business and Management, 
Communications and Education, fuses morals and values to 
investigate “moral values” (e.g., Bovasso, Jacobs & Rettig, 1991; 
Jiang, Lin, & Lin, 2011; Lewis, Kanai, Bates, & Rees, 2012; Marvell, 
1974; Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011; Pantic & Wubbels, 
2012; Prasad et al., 2009; Schnall & Roper, 2012). The concept of 
values does overlap with the concept of morals. Both are about 
codes of conduct to which individuals may refer to guide and 
motivate their daily behaviours. Morals also arguably subsume 
values, since someone’s morals should also be their values. 
Importantly, however, morals and values are not merely conven-
tions that people generally hold. For example, not everyone 
generally believes that seeking excitement (a stimulation value; 
Bardi & Schwartz, 2003) is important, and not everyone generally 
believes that one must be loyal to one’s country (Graham et al., 
2011).
Despite similarities, morals and values are distinct in important 
ways. Firstly, one could value something without necessarily 
moralising it. For instance, a person may value exercise, but 
someone who takes the elevator instead of the steps is not 
morally bad. Secondly, people can also adopt (embrace) or adapt 
(bend) values because of socialization or life circumstances 
(Schwartz, 2009). In contrast, adults and children view morals as 
objective facts about the world (Goodwin & Darley, 2008; 
Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottam, & Lewis, 2004). Lastly, even 
though people place high importance on both their morals and 
values, they prioritize the values they hold (especially when they 
conflict, such as openness to change versus tradition, Schwartz, 
2003, 2009). Due to potential conflicts and prioritization, values 
are thus up for trade-offs (Schwartz, 2009; Rokeach & Ball-
Rokeach, 1989). Morals, on the other hand, may be prohibited 
from trade-offs (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) 
2.  Although we call this “violation construal”, we differentiate it from construal theory (Trope 
& Liberman, 2010), which is related to psychological distance.
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and used as a yardstick to determine whether a justice process 
was fair or not (rather than judging the process in and of itself, 
Mullen & Skitka, 2006). Thus, given these differences, one way to 
frame the distinction between the two concepts is in terms of 
flexibility – morals are less flexible than values. Separating morals 
from values can inform us of what leads people to dehumanise 
the self versus the other – the flexibility inherent in value viola-
tions may not be suitable for self-dehumanisation due to the 
self-enhancing motive driving this perception. However, violating 
rigid morals may require self-dehumanisation.
In our work, we operationalise a moral violation as an act that is 
considered objectively wrong. When people refer to a moral viola-
tion, they will generally agree that the act is wrong. This definition 
is compatible with previous work showing that laypeople concep-
tualise morality as inflexible and objective (Goodwin & Darley, 
2008), especially when the act is negatively valenced (Goodwin & 
Darley, 2012). To be immoral means doing something objectively 
wrong, and by viewing morals as more objective, there is less 
latitude and flexibility for what is right or wrong. Whereas folk 
perceptions of morals are inflexible and objective, folk perceptions 
of values are flexible and subjective, and any act that violates a 
person’s value system will be seen as less severe and less objectively 
wrong. Hence, we operationalise a value violation as an act that 
is considered subjectively wrong – it defies a specific person’s 
beliefs, regardless of whether the belief is widely held or not.
self- versus other-focus
One can imagine that by focusing on the self, the perpetrator will 
have to reconcile his humanity with his act. This possibility is 
supported by work on cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962). 
Since individuals desire to see themselves as good, moral beings 
(e.g., Sedikides, Meek, Alicke, & Taylor, 2013), immoral behaviour 
creates a conflict with this perception that must be resolved. To 
do so, they may dehumanise themselves. However, if an action 
contradicts their values, they may modify those values so that they 
are consistent with the action. When focusing on the other, however, 
the victim’s mind is brought to the foreground, and the salience 
of this mind may lead to dehumanisation of the victim.
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Alternatively, one can imagine that by focusing on the self, the 
perpetrator neglects the perspective of the victim and thus 
believes what he did was justified. Research by moral psycholo-
gists supports this alternative possibility. In Kohlberg’s stages of 
moral development (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983), what is 
good in self-focused stages is whatever satisfies personal needs. 
In the externally focused stages, what others want and desire are 
taken into account in order to determine whether an act is good 
or bad. Relatedly, the moral disengagement model (Bandura, 
1999) also posits that unethical behaviours are associated with a 
lack of empathy. Supporting these models, research has shown 
that in organisations, individuals who become self-focused 
through increased power are more likely to ignore unethical 
social influences (Pitesa & Thau, 2013), while empathy reduces 
unethical decision making (Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008).
The literature, however, does not directly compare self- versus 
other-focus despite these contradicting predictions and despite 
its importance on how people respond in moral situations. 
Furthermore, highlighting the victim or not can affect the influ-
ence of violation construal on self- versus other-dehumanisation. 
For example, employing the moral disengagement model, a focus 
on the other can lead to increased empathy (the empathy 
hypothesis), which can weaken the influence of construal on 
target dehumanisation. It will therefore be informative to see 
whether spotlighting the agent (self) or victim (other) matters for 
dehumanisation, and importantly, to investigate how focus may 
change the relationship between violation construal and self- 
versus other-dehumanisation.
hypotheses
Two­way interaction. We predict a significant a two-way interac-
tion (violation construal x target of rating). Within the value 
violation condition, we expect more dehumanisation when rating 
the other (compared to the self). Since values are flexible, they 
may more readily allow reinterpretation of harmful actions as less 
bad because the victim deserved it. Harming non-humans does 
not make the actor a bad person, and this belief subsequently 
encourages dehumanisation of the other.
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In contrast, within the moral violation condition, we expect more 
dehumanisation when rating the self (compared to the other). 
Since morals are perceived to be inflexible, limited avenues are 
available to re-interpret bad behaviour. One way to do so is to 
make the bad behaviour consistent with a negative sense of self, 
so that an individual dehumanises the self more after committing 
a moral violation.
Three­way interaction. Given the divergent predictions of focus 
discussed above, we leave open how focus will moderate the 
relationship between violation construal and target on dehuman-
isation.
Although we predict two-way and three-way interactions, we still 
include main effects in the results section.
overview of studies
In the first set of pilot studies, we assessed lay construals of 
morals and values. In the main study, we manipulated construal 
of an action as a moral or value violation, and whether the focus 
is on the self or the victim, and we measured dehumanisation of 
the self or the other.
Pilot 1a
Why might people dehumanise the self when thinking about 
morals, but dehumanise the other more after thinking about 
values? We hypothesised that morals could be thought of as more 
rigid than values. Nonetheless, there could be several other lay 
conceptual differences between morals and values that require 
examination. Firstly, people may feel freer to choose values than 
morals, in that when presented with multiple options, they have 
the opportunity to pick which they choose to follow. Secondly, 
values could be more easily adoptable than morals, in which 
people can more readily accept values than morals. Thirdly, 
morals could be more integral to a person’s identity. Lastly, 
people may perceive morals as imposed upon people, whereas 
values are not.
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Method
In a within-subjects design, 43 participants from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (30% female; age M = 34.02, SD = 12.49) 
completed the study. Participants rated the extent to which they 
agreed with the following ten statements (five about morals, five 
about values) on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
scale: “To what extent are people free to choose their morals 
(values)?”, “To what extent are morals (values) imposed upon 
people?”, “To what extent are morals (values) flexible?”, “To what 
extent can morals (values) be adopted?”, “To what extent are 
morals (values) integral to a person’s identity?” We counterbal-
anced the order in which participants saw the morals or values 
questions first.
Results
Consistent with our predictions, we found that participants 
viewed morals (M = 3.70, SD = 1.54) as less flexible than values, 
M = 4.70, SD = 1.34, t(42) = 4.38, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 1.35. 
There were no significant differences for the other pairs, all ts(42) 
< 1.20, all ps > .20.
Pilot 1b
In the second pilot study, we replicate and confirm that partici-
pants indeed view values as more flexible than morals.
Method
Employing a within-subjects design again and counterbalancing 
whether participants saw questions about morals or values first, 
42 participants (45% female; age M = 32.57, SD = 10.16) from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk were asked to rate the following two 
statements: “To what extent are morals (values) easily change-
able?” and “To what extent are morals (values) flexible?” They 
were paid $0.50 to complete the study.
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Results
We averaged the two items to form a composite since the two 
items correlated highly with each other (r = .78 and .77 for 
values and morals respectively).
Using a paired samples t-test, we found that morals (M = 3.29, 
SD = 1.46) were considered less flexible than values, M = 3.82, 
SD = 1.41, t(41) = 4.22, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 1.30. These results 
replicated those of Pilot 1a and provide further support for our 
conjecture that morals are considered more rigid than values.
Principal study
After having confirmed that participants did indeed see values as 
more flexible than morals in the second pilot study, we asked 
participants to recall either a moral or value violation at work and 
measured the extent to which they dehumanised themselves 
versus the victim.
Method
Participants. We recruited 252 United States participants (52% 
female; age M = 31.09, SD = 10.78) from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. Sample size was determined as follows: As Cohen (1988) 
noted, a small effect size d is about .25 to .30, while a medium 
effect size is around .50. To be conservative, we used a small 
effect size to calculate the sample size needed to sufficiently 
power our study. Using the program G-Power, with 8 groups and 
a numerator degree of freedom 1, we needed at least 147 partici-
pants to detect an effect size of .30 and at least 210 participants 
to detect an effect size of .25. Participants were compensated 
$0.50 for completing the study.
Materials
Violation recall prompts. These prompts were used to prime 
thoughts of either a moral violation or a value violation:
Please think back to a time at work when you did something 
[that you might consider to conflict with your beliefs or 
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values/that you thought was wrong or immoral] to someone 
else at work. For example, you might have had to downsize 
and layoff workers, taken credit for somebody else’s work 
when you shouldn’t have, required employees to work longer 
hours, [or made other trade­offs and sacrifices that nega­
tively affected other people/or made other trade­offs that you 
thought were wrong]. Please describe what happened.
Focus prompts. These prompts were used to manipulate partici-
pants’ focus on themselves or about the person they harmed:
If you interacted with someone, what was the interaction like 
and how did [you/the other person] feel? [What were the 
thoughts going through your/What do you think were the 
thoughts going through the other person’s] mind at the time?
Human nature and uniqueness scale. This scale measures the 
extent to which a person dehumanises a target (from Bastian et 
al., 2012). Since we were interested in dehumanisation after 
harmful acts, we adapted the scale from past to present tense. 
Sample items include, “I feel like I am open-minded, like I can 
think clearly about things” (reverse coded) and “I felt like I lacked 
self-restraint, like an animal”. The scale was anchored from 1 (Not 
at all) to 7 (Very much).
Procedure
We employed a 2 (construal; moral/value) x 2 (target of focus; 
self/other) between-subjects study design. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. They first wrote 
about the violation type construed as either a moral or value 
violation. Next, to manipulate target of focus, they were asked to 
describe how they felt or the victim felt. Finally, participants rated 
either their own human nature and uniqueness or the victim’s 
human nature and uniqueness. In the latter case, we modified 
the items so that the pronouns referred to the victim rather than 
the participant.
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Results
Seven participants said that they did not have such an interaction, 
three participants did not respond adequately to the prompts 
(e.g., writing only the target of the violation) and 24 did not 
follow instructions (e.g., writing about someone else’s violation), 
resulting in 218 participants for analysis.
Dehumanisation
Given that the two subscales were highly correlated (r = .53, 
p < .001), we followed the procedures of Bastian et al. (2012) and 
analysed the data with all the items combined into one dehuman-
isation scale.
Main effects. There was a main effect of violation construal, 
where value violations (M = 2.21, SD = .06) induced more dehu-
manisation than did moral violations (M = 2.02, SD = .06), F(1, 
210) = 5.11, p = .03, Cohen’s d = .31. There was also a main 
effect of target, where people dehumanised the other (M = 2.36, 
SD = .07) more than they dehumanised the self (M = 1.88, 
SD = .05), F(1, 210) = 33.53 p < .01, Cohen’s d = .81. The effect 
of focus was marginal, where focusing on the self (M = 2.19, 
SD = .06) resulted in more dehumanisation than focusing on the 
other (M = 2.04, SD = .06), F(1,210) = 3.22, p = .07, Cohen’s 
d = .24.
Two­way interactions. Central to our hypotheses, the main effect 
of violation construal was qualified by a two-way interaction. 
Violation construal interacted with the target of rating, F(1, 210) = 
4.63, p = .03, Cohen’s d = .29 (Figure 1). Follow-up tests revealed 
that when rating the other, value construals (M = 2.54, SD = .09) 
increased other-dehumanisation compared to moral construals 
(M = 2.17, SD = .10), F(1,214) = 7.80, p < .01, but no such differ-
ences emerged in self-dehumanisation (Value M = 1.88, SD = .07; 
Moral M = 1.87, SD = .07), F(1,214) < .01, p > .90. There were 
no other significant two-way interactions – violation construal did 
not interact with focus, F(1, 210) = 1.82, p = .18, and focus did 
not interact with the target of rating, F(1, 210) = 1.32, p = .25.
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Three­way interaction. Contrary to our hypothesis, there was no 
three-way interaction, F(1, 210) = 1.73, p = .19 (Figure 2).The 
trending three-way interaction prompted us to examine the 
pattern of results. Simple effects tests revealed that when partici-
pants focused on the other, the interaction disappeared, 
F(1,109) = .39, p > .50, but the interaction remained significant 
when they focused on the self, F(1,109) = 5.60, p = .02. The 
difference between value construals and moral construals in 
other-dehumanisation became insignificant when focusing on 
the other, F(1,109) = .68, p > .40, but remained significant when 
focusing on the self, F(1,101) = 26.64, p < .01 (Figure 2).
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
Rate SelfRate Other
ValueMoral 
Focus on self Focus on other
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
ValueMoral 
Figure 1:  
The effect of violation  
construal on 
dehumanisation 
moderated by whether 
the participant rated 
the self or the other.
Figure 2:  
Construal x target 
interaction x focus  
on dehumanisation.
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content analysis
Given that people engaged in free recall, we had rich data and the 
opportunity to code for the content of the responses. This 
allowed us to see whether differences, other than the flexibility of 
the different types of violations (morals or values) emerged. It is 
possible that because values are more flexible and bendable, 
participants believed that there must have been more external 
pressure (coercion) in order to get the participant to violate a 
value. Additionally, because values are perceived to be more flex-
ible, people may attribute their behaviour to more situational 
forces in value violations due to the variable nature of situations. 
Finally, since people were asked to recall violations in the work-
place, we also wanted to know whether participants in the value 
condition might be more likely to recall firing someone. Recent 
news reports on the troubled and staggering economy indicate 
that laying someone off can be heavily due to forced circum-
stances (e.g., due to bad economy, downsizing, streamlining 
firm). If value violations induce thoughts of coercion, and firing 
someone is usually out of a person’s control, then more people 
could recall firing somebody in the value violations prompt.
Two coders, blind to our hypotheses, coded our participants’ 
recollections of moral and value violations for three pieces of 
information: whether the violation was described as coerced or 
not, whether the source of the violation was described as situa-
tional or dispositional, and whether the violation involved firing 
somebody. Out of the 218 participants whose results were anal-
ysed, two participants did not provide sufficient information for 
whether there was coercion or whether there was situational 
attribution involved. In the coercion category, the presence of 
coercion was coded as 1, while the absence of it was coded as 0. 
In the source category, a situational source of transgression was 
coded as 1, while a dispositional source was coded as 0. In the 
transgression type category, firing somebody was coded as 1, 
while other transgressions such as lying, cheating or stealing 
were coded as 0. Coders first independently coded the responses 
before meeting to resolve disagreements. Independently, they 
had an agreement rate of at least 90% for all three categories.
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Moral construal Value construal
Number of 
observations
Coercion** 0.24 0.53 216
Situational 
attribution
0.94 0.96 216
Firing* 0.09 0.18 218
We found three significant differences between the moral and 
value construals. Firstly, participants were more likely to use 
words that indicated coercion (e.g., “I had to lie”, rather than 
“I lied”) in value violations (53%) compared to moral violations 
(24%), c2(1,N=216) = 19.38, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .55 (Table 1). 
Secondly, participants writing about value violations (18%) were 
also more likely to write about firing someone compared to 
moral violations (9%), c2(1,N=218) = 3.45, p < .05, Cohen’s 
d = .27 (Table 1). There were no differences between the moral 
(94%) and value (96%) construal in whether the violation was 
attributed as situational or dispositional, c2(1,N=216) = .75, 
p > .25 (Table 1).
conclusion and discussion
Our studies showed that morals were perceived to be more 
inflexible than values, and construing an act as a value violation 
led to increased other-dehumanisation. Construal did not affect 
self-dehumanisation, however, and focusing on the self or other 
did not affect dehumanisation.
We found that construing a violation as value-based, compared to 
moral-based, led to increased other-dehumanisation. This finding 
supported our prediction. However, moral construal did not affect 
self-dehumanisation. The lack of movement in self-dehumanisation 
may be due to a floor effect. Successful self-dehumanisation 
manipulations were more involved, such as having participants 
play violent video games (Bastian et al., 2012). Since our manipu-
lation was a recall prime, it may not have been strong enough to 
induce self-dehumanisation.
TaBle 1:  
Proportion indicating 
coercion, firing 
someone, and 
situational attribution 
in responses,  
** p < .01  
and *p < .05.
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We also did not find a three-way interaction. From the results, the 
interaction between construal and target weakened when 
focusing on the other (vs. focusing on the self). Tests of simple 
effects showed that the previously significant difference between 
value and moral construal in other-dehumanisation became insig-
nificant when focusing on the other, while the difference 
remained significant when focusing on the self. This direction of 
results would support the empathy hypothesis rather than the 
cognitive dissonance hypothesis. The lack of significant three-
way interaction could be due to our subtle wording of the focus 
prime and to a mild recall prime, and so future research should 
see whether the pattern becomes significant if a stronger manip-
ulation were used.
Additionally, there could be more meaningful differences between 
moral and value construals other than flexibility, as suggested by 
the results of our content analysis. For instance, compared to 
moral violations participants more frequently described their 
value violations using words related to coercion, even though 
there were no differences in situational attribution. This suggests 
it is not whether moral and value violations stem from different 
sources, but rather how they are interpreted – in that there is 
more perceived coercion involved in value violations. We did find 
that value violations prompted more responses related to firing 
someone. As we suggested before, if value violations induce 
thoughts of coercion, and firing someone is usually out of a 
person’s control (e.g., due to bad economy, downsizing, superi-
or’s orders), it is reasonable to have observed that more people 
wrote about firing in the value violations prompt. In sum, there 
appears to be substantial differences between construing an act 
as a moral or value violation that merits further investigation in 
future studies.
Our findings should be interpreted in light of their limitations. 
Although we tried to control for the types of behaviours that 
people would recall by providing specific and identical examples 
for all conditions and merely changing how the violation is 
construed, the responses were free recall. This was advantageous 
in the sense that content analyses showed differences between 
morals and values could be more complex than flexibility, but 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
oc
um
en
t t
él
éc
ha
rg
é 
de
pu
is 
ww
w.
ca
irn
.in
fo
 - 
Co
rn
el
l U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 - 
  -
 1
32
.2
36
.1
73
.1
58
 - 
29
/0
8/
20
18
 2
1h
55
. ©
 P
re
ss
es
 u
ni
ve
rs
ita
ire
s 
de
 G
re
no
bl
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - Cornell University -   - 132.236.173.158 - 29/08/2018 21h55. © Presses universitaires de G
renoble 
Revue inteRnationale de PsycholoGie sociale 2015 n° 1
113
limited us by having less control over what people had in mind 
while giving their responses. That said, the recall prime is often 
used in the social psychological and organizational behaviour 
literatures, and show that recall primes and manipulations are 
robust (e.g., the power prime; Galinsky, Gruenfeld & Magee, 
2003; Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; 
Inesi, Botti, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2011; Lammers, Galinsky, 
Gordijn, & Otten, 2012; Rucker, Galinsky, & Dubois, 2012; Smith, 
Jostman, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008; Whitson et al., 2013) and are 
accepted manipulations in the fields. Future investigations could 
include manipulating construal of a behaviour, such as lying, as a 
moral or value transgression so that the behaviour itself is 
constant.
A possible alternative explanation of our effects is that the tense 
differences in the two construal conditions could have impacted 
dehumanisation. The value violations involved assessing the 
behaviour at the time of recall (“Please think back to a time at 
work when you did something that you might consider to conflict 
with your beliefs or values”), whereas moral violations involved 
assessing the behaviour at the time of violation (“Please think 
back to a time when you did something that you thought was 
wrong or immoral to someone else at work”). It is possible that 
using current standards to assess their violation increases other-
dehumanization as a way to preserve current moral standing. 
Despite this difference, however, the alternative explanation 
cannot explain the interaction between the target and violation 
construal (where violation construal does not impact self-rating 
dehumanization, only for other-rating dehumanization).
Lastly, the dependent variables were self-reported. It would be 
informative to have a field study with behavioural outcomes, such 
as whether someone intervenes when a target of dehumanisation 
is in pain, or to have a physiological measure of dehumanisation.
In spite of the limitations, our results suggest theoretically 
another stage at which dehumanisation can occur. Previous work 
has shown that attributes about someone (e.g., gender, attire, 
social group, status, emotions evoked, as reviewed above) can 
induce dehumanisation and lead to harmful behaviour; however, 
we show that dehumanisation can occur long after a harmful act 
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has been committed. This is congruous with work by Bastian et 
al. (2012) showing that playing a violent video game may facilitate 
other-dehumanisation. We go two steps further though and show 
that while someone may imbue the victim with mental capacities 
before harming her, he may dehumanise her (1) even after a 
significant period of time (2) with a simple reminder of their 
harmful act. This is consistent with the notion of everyday dehu-
manisation (Lee & Harris, 2014).
In terms of social context, we showed that dehumanisation could 
occur in everyday contexts, which is consistent with previous work 
(Bastian & Haslam, 2011; Gray, Knobe, Sheskin, Bloom, & Barrett, 
2011; Harris & Fiske, 2009; Leyens et al., 2007; Puvia & Vaes, 2015; 
Waytz & Epley, 2012). These subtle harms can still have insidious 
effects, including undermining a person’s status and identity 
(Bastian & Haslam, 2011) and endorsing other, more explicit 
harmful actions. In connection with related but separate work on 
mind perception, people may assuage their guilt after harming 
another person by perceiving them as relatively mindless (Waytz, 
Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). In an age that increasingly embraces 
moral relativism, the moral/value construal can influence other-
dehumanisation. When people are reminded of moral relativism 
– that people can hold different morals – they are more likely to 
subsequently engage in cheating or theft (Rai & Holyoak, 2013). 
In a similar fashion, if harmful acts are construed as values, which 
are considered more flexible and thus akin to moral relativism, 
then perhaps individuals will continue to perpetuate harm against 
others. Within the business realm, the context which we based 
our study, one can imagine that construing a harmful act, for 
example pilfering from a client, as value-based can lead to increas-
ingly damaging behaviours, such as stealing or embezzling from 
other clients. In intergroup relations, construing usage of a racial 
epithet as value-based could lead to aggression against a group. 
In contrast, our findings suggest that construing the racial epithet 
as moral-based would lead to less dehumanisation, which could 
inhibit further acts of harm.
Both other- and self-dehumanisation lead to negative conse-
quences, but could diverge in terms of the nature of such 
consequences. Other-dehumanisation could lead to aggression, 
since the external target of reduced mental inference is now less 
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than human. On the other hand, self-dehumanisation could lead 
to withdrawal, since the detrimental feelings could be directed 
inward. Veterans after combat, for example, often suffer from 
post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse and aggression 
towards others. It is possible that they way they construe their act 
could have an effect on such behaviours.
To conclude, small differences in construal between morals and 
values can have an impact on dehumanisation or objectification. 
Given that dehumanisation occurs cross-culturally (Bain, Park, Kwok, 
& Haslam, 2009; Loughnan et al., 2015) and can lead to alarming 
ramifications, more research should be conducted to further under-
stand the circumstances under which an individual may be more 
or less likely to other-dehumanise and self-dehumanise.
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